Boolean games are an expressive and natural formalism through which to investigate problems of strategic interaction in multiagent systems. Although they have been widely studied, almost all previous work on Nash equilibria in Boolean games has focused on the restricted setting of pure strategies. This is a shortcoming as finite games are guaranteed to have at least one equilibrium in mixed strategies, but many simple games fail to have pure strategy equilibria at all. We address this by showing that a natural decision problem about mixed equilibria: determining whether a Boolean game has a mixed strategy equilibrium that guarantees every player a given payoff, is NEXP-hard. Accordingly, the ǫ variety of the problem is NEXP-complete. The proof can be adapted to show coNEXPhardness of a similar question: whether all Nash equilibria of a Boolean game guarantee every player at least the given payoff.
Introduction
A multiagent environment makes strategic considerations inevitable. Any attempt to explain the behaviour of a system consisting of self-interested agents cannot ignore the fact that agents' behaviour may be influenced or completely determined by the behaviour of other agents in the system. As the field of game theory concerns itself with precisely these issues, its concepts find fertile ground in the study of multiagent systems.
A shortcoming of game theoretical techniques is that games, being combinatorial objects, are liable to get very large very quickly. Any computational application of game theory would need alternative representations to the normal and extensive forms prominent in the economics literature. One such representation, based on propositional logic, is the Boolean game.
Boolean games were initially introduced as two player games which have an algebra isomorphic to the Lindenbaum algebra for propositional logic [7] . Since then Boolean games have garnered interest from the multiagent community as a simple yet expressive framework to model strategic interaction. This has led to the study of complexity issues involved in reasoning about these games. While many questions have been answered, the issue of mixed strategies remained open.
In this paper we address this lacuna and present the first complexity result about mixed equilibria in the Boolean games literature: the NEXP-hardness of ∃GuaranteeNash, which asks whether a Boolean game has an equilibrium where each player attains at least v[i] utility, for some input vector v.
Related Work
Complexity results for Boolean games were first studied in the two player case by [5] and the n-player case by [3] , where among other results the authors showed that determining the existence of a pure equilibrium is Σ p 2 -complete in the general case, and can be easier should some restrictions be placed on the goal formulae of the players. Further enquiry into tractable fragments of Boolean games was carried out by [6] .
Cardinal extensions to Boolean games were considered as weighted Boolean formula games [8] and satisfiability games [1] , where the authors exploited the connection of a subclass of these games to congestion games [10] to obtain complexity results about both mixed and pure equilibria.
A very similar framework to Boolean games is that of Boolean circuit games [11] . There players are equipped with a Boolean circuit with k input gates and m output gates. The input gates are partitioned among the players, and a player's strategy is an assignment of values to the gates under his control. The output gates encode a binary representation of the player's utility on a given input. The authors explore a number of questions about both mixed and pure equilibria, including the complexity of ∃GuaranteeNash.
Note that a Boolean game can be seen as a very specific type of Boolean circuit game: the players' circuits are restricted to NC 1 , and the number of output gates to one. Thus easiness results for Boolean circuit games directly transfer to Boolean games, and hardness results transfer in the other direction. In particular, this means that the NEXP-completeness of ∃GuaranteeNash for Boolean circuit games proved by [11] does not imply the result of this paper.
Preliminaries
While there are many breeds of games in the literature, we here restrict ourselves to what is perhaps the most widely used class: Definition 1. A finite strategic game consists of n players, each equipped with a finite set of pure strategies, S i , and a utility function u i :
An n-tuple of strategies is called a strategy profile: thus a utility function maps strategy profiles to the reals. Example 1. In a game of matching pennies two players are given a coin each and may choose to display that coin heads or tails up. Player Two seeks to match the move of Player One, while player one seeks to avoid that. Hence we have u 2 (HH) = u 2 (T T ) = 1, u 1 (HT ) = u 1 (T H) = 1, and 0 otherwise.
Note that to represent a finite strategic game explicitly (the normal form of the game) we would need to list the players' utility on every possible profile. This would require on the order of n|S i | n entries, taking S i to mean the size of the "typical" strategy set. Such a representation is both exponential in the number of players and linear in the number of strategies: which in itself may be very large.
Ideally we would wish to avoid such a representation. If a game has some internal structure, it would be natural to ask if the game can be described in a more succinct way. In the case where the game can be interpreted as players holding propositional preferences over Boolean variables the Boolean game offers precisely that.
Definition 2.
A Boolean game is a representation of a finite strategic game given by n disjoint sets of propositional variables, Φ i , and n formulae of propositional logic, γ i .
The intended interpretation is that player i controls the variables in Φ i in an attempt to satisfy γ i , which may depend on variables not in player i's control. The set of pure strategies of player i is then 2
Φi , and his utility function is ν → 1 if ν γ i , and ν → 0 otherwise. Example 2. Matching pennies can be given a Boolean representation by setting
The size of a Boolean game is thus on the order of n(|Φ i | + |γ i |). In the best case γ i is small and the resulting representation is linear in the number of players and logarithmic in the number of strategies, giving greater succinctness on both fronts.
Having defined the game representation, we now turn to reasoning about such games. The most common solution concept is the Nash equilibrium, which we define below. 
A strategy profile s = (σ 1 , . . . , σ n ) where every σ i is a best response to s is a Nash equilibrium.
Example 3. In a game of matching pennies, T us a best response for Player One to HH, and H is a best response for Player Two. The game has no equilibria in pure strategies.
The fact that games as simple as matching pennies may fail to have a pure strategy equilibrium casts doubt on its suitability as a solution concept. Fortunately, a natural extension of the framework rectifies the matter. Definition 4. A mixed strategy for player i in a finite strategic game is a probability distribution over S i .
The utility player i obtains from a profile of mixed strategies S is p(S ′ )u i (S ′ ), where p(S ′ ) is the probability assigned to the pure profile S ′ by the mixed strategies in S.
It is in this context that Nash proved his seminal result:
). Every finite strategic game has an equilibrium in mixed strategies.
Example 4. The unique equilibrium of matching pennies involves both players randomising over their sets of strategies by assigning a weight of 0.5 to both H and T . In this equilibrium both players attain a utility of 0.5.
Since every game has an equilibrium, the algorithmic question of asking whether an equilibrium exists is not relevant. This motivates decision problems based on qualified notions of equilibria, such as the one that concerns us in this paper:
It is natural to also consider a problem closely related to the dual: 
Main Result
Our reduction will be from the following NEXP-complete problem:
NEXPTM: Given a non-deterministic Turing machine M , an integer in binary K and a string w, does M accept w in at most K steps?
Proof. For membership in NEXP, we need only simulate the computation of M on w for K steps. Each step can be simulated in non-deterministic polynomial time, and the number of steps is exponential in |K|.
For hardness, let N be a non-deterministic Turing machine with an exponential time clock f . Let M be a Turing machine with an identical transition relation to N , but with no internal clock. Clearly, N accepts w if and only if M accepts w in at most f (w) steps. That is, (M, f (w), w) is a positive instance of NEXPTM. Moreover, the triple (M, f (w), w) is polynomial in the size of N and w: |M | ≤ |N |, |w| = |w| and as f (w) ∈ O(2 p(|w|) ), when written in binary it is of size at most p(|w|). This gives us the desired reduction.
We can now prove the hardness of ∃GuaranteeNashḞor questions of NEXPmembership, see the discussion below.
Theorem 2. ∃GuaranteeNash for Boolean games is NEXP-hard.
Proof. We will give a reduction from NEXPTM. Given a triple (M, K, w) we shall construct, in polynomial time, a Boolean game G and a utility vector v, such that G has an equilibrium where player i's utility is at least v[i] if and only if M accepts w in K steps or less.
For convenience, we augment M with a "do nothing" transition: if M is at an accepting state, then we allow it to move to the next computation step without moving the head, changing state, or writing anything to the tape. It is clear that augmenting M in such a fashion does not change the language accepted by M , but it ensures that the machine state is defined at all computation steps; we do not need to worry about the case where the machine accepts in under K steps, as if it does, it will still accept at step K.
Let k = |K|, and q be the number of states of M . A computation history of M on w could be seen as a K × K table, or for simplicity 2 k × 2 k , padding as needed. Each row contains the tape contents and head position at a certain computation step. The number of bits needed to specify an entry of this table is 2k.
A way to visualise the proof is that in our game G, which consists of six players, Player One is equipped with variables that allow him to describe a single entry of this table. Player Four plays a partial matching pennies game against Player One, thereby forcing Player One to play a mixed strategy randomising over all entries of the table, and thus specifying an entire computation history with his mixed strategy. Player Two then verifies that the mixed strategy provided by Player One contains a consistent description of the head location at each computation step, and Player Three checks that every two consecutive steps are linked by exactly one transition rule. Players Five and Six play matching pennies with Players Two and Three to force them to randomise across all table entries.
To this end, let:
The intended meaning of Time
is the value of the ith most significant bit of the integer denoting the index of the computation step (respectively tape cell) in question, given the standard convention of interpreting "true" as 1 and "false" as 0. A truth assignment by Player One can therefore be read as: at the computation step specified by Time 1 is a junk variable that has no meaning). Player One's goal formula is a conjunction of four subformulae:
Intuitively, Init means that if the player plays the first computation step, their description of the machine must agree with the initial configuration of M on w. Final means that if the player plays the last (Kth) computation step, the machine must be in an accepting state. Cons 1 states the description of the machine must be internally consistent. The final conjunct is to force the player to randomise across all computation steps and tape cells, to which we will return later.
Init requires that at time zero, the configuration of the machine is faithfully represented by Player One's play. This takes the form of an implication where the antecedent states that we are at step zero:
The consequent itself is a conjunction of three further subformulae, for the head, the state and the tape.
The head requirement states that the head is at the leftmost cell. That is, at cell zero Head 1 is true, and at every other cell Left 1 is true:
The state requirement is simply M 's initial state:
The tape requirement is a conjunction of |w| + 1 implications. The first |w| implications state that if the tape cell chosen is within the first |w| cells, then its contents must agree with w. If we use i as shorthand for the conjunction of tape variables expressing i, and w[i] for Zero 1 or One 1 depending on the ith bit of w, this has the following form:
Note that this formula is linear in |w|, so the construction so far was polynomial.
The last formula in InitTape states that all other cells are blank.
Final states that at computation step K, the machine accepts. If we use K as shorthand for the appropriate conjunction of time variables, we get the following implication:
Cons 1 requires that the player's description of a given computation step and cell is internally consistent. This means the cell cannot have both 0 and 1 on it, the head must be either over the cell or to one direction and the machine must be in exactly one state. It is worth noting that this says nothing about whether Player One's description of different steps and cells are consistent with each other: this is the task of Players Two and Three.
For Cons 1 , we introduce a generalised XOR symbol, which we denote OneOf , with the interpretation that OneOf (ϕ 1 , . . . , ϕ n ) is true if and only if exactly one ϕ i is. Such a symbol could be replaced by a propositional logic formula polynomial in the size of ϕ 1 , . . . , ϕ n -simply take the disjunction of all n admissible possibilities. This gives us the desired formula: 
The objective is to guess the same computation step and cell index as player one:
Player Two's purpose is to verify the consistency of Player One's description of the head. This involves verifying that at a given computation step the Head 1 variable is true in exactly one cell, Left 1 is true in every cell to the right and Right 1 is true in every cell to the left. She controls the following variables:
The lowercase "s" can be read as "successor". The intended meaning of these variables is that Tape Player Two's goal formula is a conjunction of four subformulae:
Intuitively, MatchOne 2 states that Player Two ought to play the same head configuration as dictated by Player One. Cons 2 requires that this configuration be internally consistent. Succ 2 is to ensure that the two cells chosen are indeed consecutive.
Before we state MatchOne 2 we ought to first ask what we mean by saying that players one and two play the same head configuration. As in any given (pure) strategy profile, either player will be describing a single computation step and at most two cells; if it turns out that they are speaking about different step/cell configurations we should not be concerned about whatever claims they make. Only in the instance where they happen to refer to the same step/cell should we expect accord. Since Player Two is referring to two cells in any play, we require that if either of the cells she references coincides with that referenced by Player One, they must agree.
The desired formula is thus of the following form:
The subformulae are as follows:
Internal consistency amounts simply to the conjunction of the valid combinations of claims about the head:
Succ 2 states that the two tape locations are, in fact, consecutive. We will prove a lemma to show that this is concisely expressible in propositional logic. Succ(p 1 , . . . , p n ; q 1 , . . . , q n ) be a formula that is true if and only if the binary integer encoded by q 1 , . . . , q n is the successor of the binary integer encoded by p 1 , . . . , p n . As a convention, 2 n − 1 has no successor. Succ(p 1 , . . . , p n ; q 1 , . . . , q n ) can be replaced by a propositional formula of size polynomial in p 1 , . . . , p n and q 1 , . . . , q n .
Lemma 1. Let
Proof. We take advantage of the fact that to increment a binary integer we only need to modify the rightmost consecutive block of 1s, and there are only n such possible blocks.
Since we have a boundary condition to consider, we require that the first integer is not 2 n − 1:
Succ ′ is then:
. . .
This is quadratic in the number of variables, giving us the desired result.
Succ 2 can then be stated simply:
Finally, Player Five is trying to guess Player Two's choice of cell and computation step.
Player Three's purpose is to verify that the tape contents in successive computation steps respect the transition rules of M . To do this he specifies a total of six cells and two computation steps: consecutive triples in consecutive steps. Then he verifies that the tape contents, head position and machine state are in agreement with some rule of M . 
The "p" can be read as "predecessor", referring to the cell to the left, and "n" as "next computation step". The intended meaning is simply the state and tape contents in each of the six cells, as well as whether the head is over that cell.
Player Three's goal formula is a conjunction of five subformulae:
MatchOne 3 states that if any of the step/cell pairs named by Player Three coincide with the one named by Player One, Player Three must agree with Player One. Triple requires that the three cells named in either computation step should be a consecutive triple, and the triple at either step must be the same. Succ 3 requires the two computation steps named to be consecutive. Rules is to verify that the configuration thus described is consistent with a rule of M .
MatchOne 3 is a conjunction of a total of six statements, depending on which step/cell pair coincides with that played by Player One. We will only give one such statement below, in the case that Player One named the same step as Time 
Triple states that the tape cells selected are consecutive triples, and that the same triple is chosen in both steps. It is worth noting that given our previous definition of successor, if Player Three is to satisfy this conjunct then the middle cell cannot be 0 or 2 k − 1.
Succ 3 requires that the computation steps be consecutive:
Rules is a conjunction of four formulae: three of the formulae are conjunctions containing an implication for each (r, s) ∈ Q × {0, 1, ⊥}, representing the machine's behaviour if it reads s in state r and the head is over the left, centre or right cell respectively. The fourth term is NoHead , to handle the case where the head is not over any cell in the triple:
We will examine Left and NoHead , understanding that Centre and Right are handled in similar fashion.
The s in the antecedent is meant to be replaced by pZero 3 , pOne 3 , or ¬(pZero 3 ∨ pOne 3 ) as appropriate. The intuition of the Rules term is that should the machine read s in state r it should pick exactly one of the rules available to it, and if the head is not present then the tape contents should not change.
The subformula to deal with a specific rule can be broken up as follows:
L describes the behaviour of the machine if the left cell is not the leftmost cell on the tape, B deals with the boundary case where it is. We will give an example of how Rule[(q 3 , 0) → (q 4 , 1, L)] would be handled. All rules except "do nothing" can be handled similarly, and "do nothing" would merely assert that if the machine reads an accepting state, then nothing changes.
The L part triggers if the head is over the leftmost cell in the triple, and the leftmost cell is not cell 0. It then ensures that in the next computation step the leftmost cell contains 1 and the other cells are unchanged. Since the head leaves the monitored triples we need no terms to account for it.
In the boundary case the head is over the leftmost cell of the tape, so when it attempts to move left it instead stands still.
Finally, the NoHead term asserts in the absence of a head the tape contents do not change.
This brings us to the last player, who is trying to guess the first step and central cell chosen by Player Three:
The construction so far has been polynomial. We now claim that M having an accepting run on w in at most K steps is equivalent to the constructed game having a Nash equilibrium where Players One, Two and Three have the following guaranteed payoffs:
.
First, suppose M has an accepting run on w in at most K steps. Consider the profile where Player One randomises over all step/cell combinations with equal weight, and at each step/cell combination plays his variables in accordance to the accepting run. Player Four also randomises over all step/cell combinations with equal weight. Player Two randomises over all computation steps and the first 2 k − 1 cells. Her other variables she plays in accordance to the run. Player Five likewise randomises over all steps and the first 2 k − 1 cells. Player Three randomises over the first 2 k − 1 steps and the 2 k − 2 cells between the first and last. His other variables he plays in accordance to the run. Player Six randomises over the same 2 k − 1 steps and the 2 k − 2 cells. In such a profile, Players One, Two and Three will satisfy their goals unless their step/cell combination is guessed by their opponent. Given our setup, this will happen with probabilities 1/2 2k , 1/2 k (2 k − 1) and 1/(2 k − 2)(2 k − 1) respectively, giving us the payoffs v [1] , v [2] and v [3] . It remains to see that this profile is in equilibrium.
Let us first consider Players Four through Six. Any pure strategy by Player Four is a step/cell pair, and hence, given the play of Player One, has a 1/2 2k chance of satisfying γ 4 . Player Four is thus indifferent between the current situation and any deviation. For Player Five any pure strategy using the first 2 k − 1 cells will have a 1/2 k (2 k − 1) chance of satisfying γ 5 , and any other pure strategy 0. Player Five thus likewise has no incentive to deviate. In the same fashion, any pure strategy for Player Six will satisfy γ 6 with probability 1/(2 k − 2)(2 k − 1) or 0, so she is also indifferent. In the case of Player One, observe that no matter what pure strategy he picks, there is a 1/2 2k chance of Player Four guessing the cell/step component and thus making γ 1 false. It follows that any such strategy will yield at most a v[1] chance of satisfying γ 1 . For Player Two, if she picks a pure strategy using the first 2 k − 1 cells there will likewise be a 1/2 k (2 k − 1) chance of her step/cell combination being guessed. If she picks a pure strategy using the last cell, she will be unable to satisfy the Succ 2 component of γ 2 , yielding a utility of 0. For Player Three, any pure strategy using the 2 k − 1 steps and the 2 k − 2 cells randomised over by six will have a 1/(2 k − 2)(2 k − 1) chance of being guessed, and any other choice of pure strategy will violate either Triple or Succ 3 . This establishes that the described profile is in equilibrium.
Next, suppose that no accepting run exists. We claim that in any equilibrium Player One will still obtain a utility of v [1] , but either Player Two or three will be unable to secure a payoff of v [2] , v [3] . For the first part, note that for any choice of step/cell by Player One, the remaining variables can be set to satisfy Init, Final and Cons 1 unilaterally. It is sufficient to simply respect the initial configuration of the machine at step zero, play an accepting state at step K, and any internally consistent description elsewhere. Any strategy that does not satisfy Init , Final and Cons 1 is thus dominated and can be excluded from consideration. All that remains is the choice of cell/step and it is easy to see that the only equilibrium play would involve giving every pair equal weight.
Player One's play will thus describe a sequence of 2 k configurations of M , with the initial configuration at step zero and an accepting state at step K. However, as M has no accepting run on w in K steps, this sequence cannot represent a valid computation and a violation must occur somewhere.
If this violation involves the assertion of the presence of more than one head or the Left 1 , Right 1 variables incorrectly specifying the location of the head, we claim that Player Two cannot obtain a utility of v [2] .
Observe that in this case there must exist two consecutive cells at some time step where Player One plays one of the following combinations: In this case, should Player Two play a strategy involving cell i, since she is committed to playing a legal head assignment she will have to disagree with Player One on either cell i or cell i + 1. This means she will suffer a 1/2 2k chance of having MatchOne falsified if Player One plays the cell in question. As there is still at least a 1/2 k (2 k − 1) chance of having the cell/step combination guessed by Player Five, this means the maximum utility Player Two can obtain in this case is v
. (The last term is to avoid double counting the case where both Player One and Player Five name the same cell/step combination.)
Of course, Player Two may opt in this case not to play any strategies involving cell i. This will however mean that she is randomising over at most (2 k − 2) cells, and Player Five will randomise accordingly, meaning the highest utility she can obtain is
. Suppose now that Player One does not make such a violation. The remaining possibilities for an incorrect run are:
1. The head make an illegal transition.
2. The tape contents undergo an illegal change.
3. The state undergoes an illegal change.
Let us deal with case 1. Suppose between step t and t + 1 the head, which is at cell i at t, performs an illegal transition. This could mean moving more than one cell in a direction, moving off the edge of the tape, staying still in a nonaccepting state or moving one cell left or right without a justifying transition rule. Observe that neither of these possibilities is consistent with the Rules requirement. As such, should Player Three pick step t and cell i, he will have to disagree with Player One on the movement of the head, thereby running a risk of falsifying his formula should Player One play t and i. This will prevent Player Three from obtaining v 3 utility for the same reasoning as with Player Two.
In case 2, there would exist steps t and t + 1, and a cell i the contents of which would change without a justifying rule. This, too, would violate Rules. For case 3, we note that by the machine state we mean the state variable that occurs in the same cell as the head: the value of the other state variables is of no account. As such, Rules again would be violated as it requires the correct state to be propagated to cell hosting the head. This completes the proof.
We can adapt this proof to show that ∀GuaranteeNash is coNEXP-hard. Note that this does not follow immediately: ∀GuaranteeNash is not simply the complement of ∃GuaranteeNash. Letting s range over equilibrium profiles, ∀GuaranteeNash is the question whether:
the complement of ∀GuaranteeNash is then:
To show that ∀GuaranteeNash is coNEXP-hard we need only show that the latter problem is NEXP-hard. Corollary 1. ∀GuaranteeNash is coNEXP-hard.
Proof. We argue that the proof of Theorem 2 can be adapted to show this. Note that the utilities of Players One, Four, Five and Six did not play a rôle in the proof. Those of Four, Five and Six were omitted entirely, whereas Player One has been seen to achieve v[1] utility in every equilibrium. What remains are Two and Three, and we will argue that those players could be collapsed into a single player.
Introduce a new player into the game constructed in the proof of Theorem 2, Player Seven, with γ 7 = γ 2 ∧ γ 3 and Φ 7 = ∅. We argue that the Turing machine M accepts w in at most K steps if and only if there exists an s for which:
This can be seen by replicating the argument in the proof: in the presence of an accepting run, the only way Player Seven can lose utility is if Player Five or Six guesses the same cell/step, which happens with probabilities
respectively. Adding a term for double counting and simplifying yields the quantity above.
We have thus shown that the following question is NEXP-hard:
For the next step, add Player Eight with γ 8 = ¬γ 7 and Φ 8 = ∅. As u 8 = 1 − u 7 the following question is NEXP-hard as well, letting v[8] = 1 − v [7] :
It remains to show that the inequality can be made strict.
First, observe that we can increase Player Seven's score, and hence decrease Player Eight's, by an arbitrarily small ǫ of a certain form: let γ All that remains is to show that we can identify a "sufficiently small" ǫ. By this we mean an ǫ satisfying the following:
To see that this is possible, recall that if M does not accept w in K steps, then Player One necessarily specifies an incorrect computation history of the machine. As we have seen in the proof of Theorem 2, such a violation decreases the maximum attainable score of Player Two or Three by a fixed amount. It is thus possible to calculate the maximum attainable utility of Player Seven in the presence of such a violation, which will give us the bounds within which ǫ may reside.
This completes the proof.
Discussion
The preceding proof raises two related questions. To begin with, one may ask whether six players are necessary. The answer is no: the reader may convince themselves that one may reduce the number to three in a straightforward fashion by collapsing Players Two and Three, and Four, Five and Six onto each other, in a similar fashion to the proof of the corollary. We used six players to simplify the exposition of the proof. Whether it is further possible to reduce the number to two is a different matter. Second: whether there is a membership result to go with the hardness. Strictly speaking, there is not. As there exist games where every equilibrium requires irrational weights on the strategies chosen ( [9] ; [2] ) we cannot rely on the intuitive approach of guessing a strategy profile and checking whether it is in equilibrium.
One way this problem is addressed in the literature is to restrict attention to two player games, where a rational equilibrium is guaranteed to exist. This brings us back to the first question. The second way is to consider the notion of an ǫ-equilibrium: a profile of strategies where no player can gain more than ǫ utility by deviating. This problem, ǫ-∃GuaranteeNash, clearly does belong to NEXP and the reader can convince themselves that by inserting a sufficiently small ǫ into the proof above we can establish that it is NEXP-complete.
Conclusion
We have shown that the problem of determining whether a Boolean game has a Nash equilibrium which guarantees each player a certain payoff is NEXP-hard. This is the first complexity result about mixed equilibria in the Boolean games framework, and demonstrates that in this instance Boolean games are as difficult as the more general class of Boolean circuit games.
The complexity of many other natural problems remains open, most significantly that of Nash: the task of computing a mixed equilibrium. However, given the difficulty in obtaining this result for normal form games [4] one could posit that it is unlikely that this can be achieved with the current tools of complexity theory. It would be interesting to see whether there is an exponential time analogue of PPAD that could lead to a solution to this problem.
